The story of the famous Melian Dialogue was originally written over 2,500 years ago by ancient Greek historian Thucydides. I have included both the text and audio version in this Substack (and removed the paywall) for easier sharing because of how important the lessons from this ancient historic text are even today.
What follows is meant to serve as both a stand-alone episode and as a supplemental to my recent essay/podcast called: "The Strong Do What They Can and the Weak Suffer What They Must — A Deep Dive into the End of Post-WWII Moral Internationalism and a Revival of the 2,500-Year-Old Melian Dialogue.”
For a little bit of context before we dive in, the Melian Dialogue was one short chapter in Thucydides’ multi-volume historical account of the History of the Peloponnesian War, in which he meticulously documented the entire 27-year-long war between Athens and Sparta. He himself served as an Athenian general during that war.
The chapter on the Melian Dialogue describes the dramatized negotiations between Athens and the rulers of the small island city-state of Melos, in the Aegean Sea, on the eve of Athens fateful siege of the city as Melos tried in vain to negotiate for its independence, offering its loyal friendship to Athens as an alternative to being conquered.
Even today, the Melian Dialogue is still taught in universities and military colleges all around the world as a case study in political realism and because of the profound and complex philosophical questions that are captured by this short story. As our current world transitions from the heady idealism of the now-defunct post-WWII era into a harsher multi-polar world where national interests once again trump all other considerations, the Melian Dialogue is required reading to understand what is to come.
Some truths are as valid today as they were 2,500 years ago. I promise the short story of the Melian Dialogue is well worth your time.
I have combined the text of several earlier translations and updated them into modernized English to create an easy-to-read standalone story. My version draws from three translations: Benjamin Jowett’s 1881 translation (available on the Internet Archive), Richard Crawley’s 1914 translation (available for free on Project Gutenberg), and Rex Warner’s 1916 translation (available on both the Internet Archive and on Amazon (Amazon affiliate link)). Links to all three are provided in the text version of this essay. If you want to take a deeper dive into Thucydides works, I recommend reading the Rex Warner edition as the easiest to read of the three versions.
The Melian Dialogue
by Thucydides, from his History of the Peloponnesian War (Book 5, Chapter 17)
Sixteenth Year of the War—The Melian Conference—and the Fate of Melos
In the summer of 416 BC, the Athenians also launched an expedition against the island of Melos. The Melians are a colony from Sparta. They had refused to join the Athenian empire like the other islanders, and at first had remained neutral without helping either side; but afterwards, when the Athenians had brought force to bear on them by laying waste to their land, they had become open enemies of Athens.
Now the Athenian generals encamped in Melian territory and, before doing any harm to the land, first of all sent representatives to negotiate. The Melians refused to give them a public hearing, but instead asked them to state the object of their mission in a closed-door session open only to the island’s magistrates and governing council, to which the Athenian envoys replied:
ATHENIANS: Since we are not allowed to speak directly to the people, no doubt in case the mass of the people should hear once and for all and without interruption an argument from us which is both persuasive and incontrovertible, and should so be led astray — for we are perfectly aware that this is why you have only granted us a private audience — why don’t you select few who sit here take an even more cautious approach? Let us have no set speeches at all, but let us proceed one statement at a time, to which you may reply at once with your disapproval and criticisms to settle that which you do not like, before proceeding further. Do you like this proposal?
To which the Council of the Melians responded:
MELIANS: The quiet interchange of explanations is a reasonable thing, and we do not object to that. But your military preparations are too far advanced to agree with what you say, as we see you have come to be judges in your own cause, and that at the end of the negotiation, if the justice of our cause wins the argument and we therefore refuse to yield, we may expect war; and if we are convinced by your arguments, slavery.
To which the Athenians replied:
ATHENIANS: If you have met with us to speculate about the future, or for any other purpose other than to look the facts in the face and on the basis of these facts to consider how you can save your city from destruction, then we can end this conversation now; otherwise, we are ready to proceed with our negotiation.
The Melians responded:
MELIANS: It is natural and understandable for people in our position to explore all kinds of arguments and different points of view. But we admit that this conference has met to consider the question of the preservation and security of our country; and therefore let the argument proceed in the manner which you propose.
And so, the Athenians began:
ATHENIANS: Well then, we shall not trouble you with specious pretences—either of how we have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Persians, or are now attacking you because of some wrong that you have inflicted on us—we will not make long speeches like that, which you would not believe; and in return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying that, although you are a colony of Sparta, you have not taken part in their military expeditions or that you have never done us any harm. Instead we recommend that you should try to get what it is possible for you to get, taking into consideration what we both really think; since you know as well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, that the question of justice arises only between parties equal in strength. Outside of that, the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak must accept what they have to accept.
To which the Melians replied:
MELIANS: Then in our view (since you force us to leave matters of justice aside and to confine ourselves only to self-interest) – it is at any rate useful that you should not destroy a principle that is to the general good of all men – namely, that in the case of all who fall into danger there should be such a thing as fair play and just dealing, and that such people should even be allowed to use and to profit from arguments that are not strictly valid if they can get away with it. And this is a principle which is as much in your interest as in ours, since your own defeat would also be followed by the most terrible punishments to set an example for the rest of the world.
The Athenians shot back:
ATHENIANS. The end of our empire, if end it should, does not frighten us: we are not so much frightened of being conquered by a power which rules over others, as Sparta does (not that we are concerned with Sparta for now), as of what would happen if our own subjects may some day rise up and overthrow their former masters. This, however, is a risk that we are content to take. We will now proceed to show you that we have come here in the interest of our empire, and that we shall say what we are now going to say for the preservation of your country; we do not want any trouble in bringing you into our empire, and we want you to be spared for the good both of yourselves and of ourselves.
MELIANS: And how could it turn out as good for us to serve you, as for you to rule us?
ATHENIANS: Because you would have the advantage of submitting before suffering the worst, and we would gain by not destroying you.
MELIANS: So you would not agree to our being neutral friends instead of enemies, but allies of neither side?
ATHENIANS: No, because it is not so much your hostility that can hurt us; it is rather the case that, if we were on friendly terms with you, our subjects would regard that as a sign of our weakness, whereas your hatred is evidence of our power.
MELIANS: Is that your idea of fair play? – that no distinction should be made between people who are quite unconnected with you and people who are mostly your own colonists or else rebels that you have conquered?
ATHENIANS: As far as right and wrong are concerned, subjects think that there is no difference between the two, that those who still preserve their independence do so because they are strong, and that if we fail to attack them it is because we are afraid. By conquering you we shall not only increase the size but the security of our empire. We rule the sea and you are islanders, and weaker islanders than the others; it is therefore particularly important that you should not escape.
MELIANS: But do you think there is no security for you in what we proposed? For here again, since you will not let us mention justice, but tell us to give in to your interests, we, too, must tell you what our interests are and, if yours and ours happen to coincide, we must try to persuade you of the fact. Is it not certain that you will make enemies of all states who are at present neutral when they see what is happening here, and naturally conclude that in course of time you will attack them too? Doesn’t your action strengthen the enemies you have already?, and force others to become your enemies even against their intentions and inclinations?
ATHENIANS: As a matter of fact we are not so much frightened of states on the continent. They have their liberty, and this means that it will be a long time before they begin to take precautions against us. We are more concerned about islanders like yourselves, who are still unsubdued, or subjects who have already become embittered by the constraint which our empire imposes on them. These are the people who are most likely to act in a reckless manner and to bring themselves, and us too, into the most obvious danger.
MELIANS: Well then, if you are willing to risk so much to retain your empire, and your subjects are willing to risk so much to escape from it, we who are still free would show ourselves to be great cowards and weaklings if we failed to face everything that comes rather than submit to slavery.
ATHENIANS: No, not if you are sensible. This is no fair fight, with honour on one side and shame on the other, but a question of self-preservation and of not resisting those who are far stronger than you are.
MELIANS: Yet we know that in war, fortune sometimes makes the odds more level than could be expected from the difference in numbers of the two sides. And if we surrender, then all our hope is lost at once. Whereas, so long as we remain in action, there is still a hope that we may yet stand upright.
ATHENIANS: Ah, hope, that comforter in danger! If one already has solid advantages to fall back upon, one can indulge in hope. In that case, it may do harm but will not lead to complete ruin. But hope is by nature an expensive commodity, and those who risk everything on one roll of the dice only find out what they have risked when they are already ruined; the false promise of hope is never in short supply while you still have time to take wiser precautions. Do not let this happen to you, you who are weak and whose fate depends on a single toss of the dice. Do not be like those people who, as so commonly happens, miss the chance of saving themselves in a humane and practical way and, when every clear and distinct hope has left them in their hour of greatest need, turn to what is blind and vague, to prophecies and oracles and such things which by encouraging hope lead men to ruin.
MELIANS: You may be sure that we are as aware as you of the difficulty of opposing your power and fortune, unless the terms be equal. Nevertheless, we trust that the gods may grant us fortune as good as yours because we are standing up for what is righteous and just, and against what is clearly an injustice. — And as for what we lack in power, we trust that it will be made up for by our alliance with the Spartans, who are bound, if for no other reason than for honour’s sake and because we are their kinsmen, to come to our help. Our confidence, therefore, is not as entirely irrational as you think.
ATHENIANS: When you speak of earning the favour of the gods, we may as fairly hope for that as yourselves. Our aims and our actions are perfectly consistent with the beliefs men hold about the gods and with the principles which govern their conduct. Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men lead us to conclude that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule whatever one can. This is not a law that we made ourselves, nor were we the first to act upon it when it was made. We found it already in existence, and we shall leave it to exist forever among those who come after us. We are merely acting in accordance with it, and we know that you or anybody else with the same power as ours would be acting in precisely the same way. And therefore, so far as the gods are concerned, we see no good reason why we should fear to be at a disadvantage. But with regard to your views about Sparta and your confidence that she, out of a sense of honour, will come to your aid, we must say that we congratulate you on your simplicity but do not envy you your folly. In matters that concern themselves or their own constitution, the Spartans are quite remarkably good; as for their relations with others, that is a long story, but it can be expressed shortly and clearly by saying that of all people we know the Spartans are most conspicuous for believing that what they like doing is honourable and what suits their interests is just. This kind of attitude is not going to be of much help to you in your absurd quest to count on them for your safety.
MELIANS: But this is the very point where we can feel most sure. Their own self-interest will make them refuse to betray their own colonists, the Melians, for that would mean losing the confidence of their friends among the other Greeks even as it benefits their enemies.
ATHENIANS: You seem to forget that if one follows their own self-interest, one wants to be safe, whereas the path of justice and honour involves putting oneself in danger. And, where danger is concerned, the Spartans are not, as a rule, very venturesome.
MELIANS: But we think that they would even endanger themselves for our sake and count the risk more worth take than in the case of others because we are so geographically close to the Peloponnese Peninsula that they could operate more easily… and, because we are their most dependable ally since we are of the same race and share the same feelings.
ATHENIANS: Yes, but what an intending ally relies upon is not the goodwill of those who ask his aid, but their strength and willingness to use their power to spring into action when it is their turn to be called upon; and the Spartans value this even more than others. Their distrust of their home resources is so great that they only ever attack a neighbour if they can bring a great army of allies with them. Therefore, it is hardly likely, while we are in control of the sea, that they will cross that sea to defend an island.
MELIANS: But they still might send others. The Cretan Sea is a wide one, and it is harder for those who control it to intercept others, than for those who want to slip through to do so safely. And even if they were to fail in this, they would instead attack your own land and the land of your allies. So, instead of you attacking places that do not presently belong to you, you will instead have to fight to defend your own country and your own confederacy.
ATHENIANS: Some diversion of the kind of which you speak is a possibility and something that has in fact happened before. And it may happen in your case, but you are well aware that the Athenians have never yet relinquished a single siege operation through fear of others.
But we are somewhat shocked to find that, though you announced your intention to discuss how you could preserve yourselves, in all this talk you have said absolutely nothing which could justify a man in thinking that he could be preserved. Your chief points are concerned with what you hope may happen in the future, while your actual resources are too scanty to give you a chance of survival against the forces that we can bring to bear upon you.
You will therefore be showing an extraordinary lack of common sense if, after you have asked us to retire from this meeting, you still fail to reach a conclusion wiser than anything you have mentioned so far.
Do not be led astray by a false sense of honour – a thing which often brings men to ruin when they are faced with an obvious danger that somehow affects their pride. For in many cases, men have still been able to see the dangers ahead of them, but this thing called “dishonour”, this word, by its own force of seduction, has drawn them into a state where they have surrendered to an idea, while in fact they have fallen voluntarily into irrevocable disaster, in dishonour, that is all the more dishonourable, because it has come to them from their own folly rather than their misfortune.
This, if you are well advised, you will guard against; and you will not think it dishonourable to submit to the greatest city in Greece, especially when she is offering you such reasonable terms — an alliance on a tribute-paying basis and the liberty to continue to enjoy the country that belongs to you. And, when you are allowed to choose between war and safety, you will not be so insensitively arrogant as to make the wrong choice.
This is the safe rule – to stand up to one’s equals, to behave with deference towards one’s superiors, and to treat one’s inferiors with moderation. Think it over again when we have withdrawn from the meeting, and reflect once and again that you are discussing the fate of your country, that you have only one country, and that its future, for good or ill, depends on this one single decision which you are going to make.
~ ~ ~
The Athenians then withdrew from the discussion. The Melians, left to themselves, reached a conclusion which was much the same as they had indicated through their previous replies. Their answer was as follows:
‘Our decision Athenians, is just the same as it was at first. We will not in this brief moment deprive our city of the freedom that it has enjoyed since its founding seven hundred years ago. We put our trust in the fortune that the gods will send (which has saved us until now) and in the help of men – that is, of the Spartans; and so we shall try to save ourselves. But we invite you to allow us to be friends of yours and enemies to neither side, to make a treaty which shall be agreeable to both you and us, and so to leave our country.’
Such was the answer of the Melians. As the Athenians departed from the conference, they said: ‘Well, you alone, as it seems to us, judging from this decision of yours, you seem to us quite unique in your ability to consider the future as something more certain than what is before your eyes, and to see uncertainties as realities, simply because you would like them to be so. As you have staked most on, and trusted most, in Spartans, luck, and hopes, so in all these three things you will find yourselves most completely deceived.’
The Athenian envoys returned to their army; and the Athenian generals, finding that the Melians would not submit, immediately commenced hostilities and built a wall completely round the city of Melos. After a while, they left behind a garrison of some of their own and some allied troops to blockade the place by land and sea, and returned home with the greater part of their army. The force left behind stayed on and continued with the siege.
Around the same time, the Argives, who were allies of the Athenians, invaded Phliasia, who were allies of Sparta, and lost eighty men who were cut off in an ambush. Meanwhile the Athenians at Pylos took so much plunder from the Spartans that the latter, although they still refrained from breaking off the treaty and restarting the war with Athens, issued a proclamation saying that any of their allies wished to do so, they were free to launch raids against the Athenians. The Corinthians (Spartan allies) declared war upon the Athenians because of private quarrels of their own, but the rest of the Peloponnesians stayed quiet.
During this interlude, the Melians launched a night attack and captured the part of the Athenian lines opposite the market-place. They killed some of the troops, and then, after bringing in corn and any other useful item that they could lay their hands on, retired again and made no further moves, while the Athenians took measures to keep better guard in the future. And so, the summer came to an end.
The next winter the Spartans planned to invade the territory of Argos, but arriving at the frontier they found conditions for crossing the sea unfavourable, and went back home. But the fact that they had intended to invade raised suspicions within Argos about the loyalty of some of their fellow citizens inside their city, some of whom they arrested, though others succeeded in escaping.
About this same time the Melians again captured another part of the Athenian lines where there were only a few of the garrison on guard. As a result of this, Athens sent more reinforcements. Siege operations were now conducted much more vigorously and, in combination with some treachery on the inside, the Melians were forced to surrender unconditionally to the Athenians. All of the men of military age were put to death, the women and children were all sold as slaves, and Athens subsequently sent out five hundred settlers of their own to establish an Athenian colony on the island.
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